We investigate the problem of identifying adversarial attacks on image-based neural networks. We present intriguing experimental results showing significant discrepancies between the explanations generated for the predictions of a model on clean and adversarial data. Utilizing this intuition, we propose a framework which can identify whether a given input is adversarial based on the explanations given by the model. Code for our experiments can be found here: https://github.com/seansaito/ Explaining-Away-Attacks-Against-Neural-Networks.
INTRODUCTION
Adversarial attacks cause state-of-the-art neural networks to make misclassifications to inputs with imperceptible perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014) . In this work, we propose a framework for detecting adversarial attacks by utilizing the explanations of the model's predictions. Our experiments in Section 4 demonstrate that this framework can detect untargeted attacks at 99.81% accuracy and targeted attacks at 99.87% accuracy.
EXPLAINING PREDICTIONS ON

ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In an adversarial attack, the goal of an attacker is to construct an inputx that is minimally perturbed from the original clean input x which causes some misclassification (an untargeted attack) or a desired prediction (a targeted attack) from a neural network. Several methods exist which achieve this, including the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2016) , which iteratively finds the gradient of the model's loss function with respect to the input:
where controls the magnitude of peturbations made to the image, resulting in perceptively identical images which cause large deviations in the behavior of the model. We hypothesize that the explanations of the model on each prediction would also vary significantly, which could potentially be a clue to identify whether a given prediction was caused by an adversarial attack.
Proceedings of the 2 nd SysML Conference, Palo Alto, CA, USA, 2019. Copyright 2019 by the author(s). To evaluate this hypothesis, we generate explanations via the SHAP Integrated Gradients framework (Lundberg & Lee, 2017) , a framework which combines Integrated Gradients, a gradient-based pixel attribution method (Sundararajan et al., 2017) , with SHAP, an additive feature attribution method that calculates Shapley values for each pixel:
In all experiments in this work, we generate explanations via the Inception-V3 model (Szegedy et al., 2016) . 
A FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTING
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
We propose a simple yet effective framework for detecting adversarial attacks. Based on the training images (S ori ), adversarial samples (S adv ), and neural network f , we treat the SHAP values coming from the predictions of f as feature descriptors, denoted as Z ori and Z adv respectively. We combine Z ori and Z adv to construct a binary classification dataset which trains an adversarial example detector D(z). For any future sample s and prediction f (s), we generate SHAP values z s and call D(z s ) to indicate whether the sample is adversarial.
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Our dataset contains 10,000 pairs of images from ImageNet across all classes, with 20% held out for testing. We employ three types of BIM attacks: untargeted, targeted (random class), and targeted (2 nd most confident class). We set as 0.1 for all attacks. Table 1 shows attack success rates.
We experiment with two off-the-shelf classifiers to assess how well they can detect adversarial examples based on the SHAP feature descriptors. Results shown in Table 2 indicate that simple classifiers can detect adversarial examples with high accuracy. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown empirical results suggesting that explanations can help us detect adversarial attacks. Future work would focus on evaluating and refining this method under additional threat models.
